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Abstract
With the explosive growth of e-commerce, online transaction fraud has become
one of the biggest challenges for e-commerce platforms. The historical behaviors
of users provide rich information for digging into the users’ fraud risk. While
considerable efforts have been made in this direction, a long-standing challenge
is how to effectively exploit internal user information and provide explainable
prediction results. In fact, the value variations of same field from different events
and the interactions of different fields inside one event have proven to be strong
indicators for fraudulent behaviors. In this paper, we propose the Dual Importance-
aware Factorization Machines (DIFM), which exploits the internal field information
among users’ behavior sequence from dual perspectives, i.e., field value variations
and field interactions simultaneously for fraud detection. The proposed model is
deployed in the risk management system of one of the world’s largest e-commerce
platforms, which utilize it to provide real-time transaction fraud detection. Ex-
perimental results on real industrial data from different regions in the platform
clearly demonstrate that our model achieves significant improvements compared
with various state-of-the-art baseline models. Moreover, the DIFM could also give
an insight into the explanation of the prediction results from dual perspectives.
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of e-commerce and e-payment, the problem of online transaction fraud
has become increasingly prominent [4]. For example, according to the statistics2, Alibaba reached
single day Gross Merchandise Volume (GMV) of 268 billion CNY in Double 11 Global Shopping
Festival 3. A very small portion of fraudulent transaction could easily lead to huge financial loss and
threaten the e-commerce business.
Therefore, real-time fraud detection has become a key factor in determining the success of e-commerce
platforms. Recently, considerable efforts have shifted from rule-based expert system [3, 21, 22]
to neural network-based models [8, 29, 31, 12, 4, 16] for fraud detection. The historical events
(behaviors) of users provide rich information for digging into the users’ fraud risk as shown in Figure
1(a). However, due to model structure limitation, it is difficult for the above methods to exploit the
∗Corresponding author: Fuzhen Zhuang.
2https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/29999/double-11-2019/
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singles%27_Day
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Figure 1: (a) A typical fraud detection task which exploits the user’s historical operation events
information for determining the fraudulent risk of target payment event. (b) An example of operation
events set E.
internal field information thoroughly among events (e.g., the field value variations among the history
events or field interactions inside each event) nor provide explainable prediction results, which are
crucial in fraud detection.
In this paper, we propose the Dual Importance-aware Factorization Machines (DIFM) to efficiently
take advantage of internal field information among events, which could not only improve the perfor-
mance of fraud detection but also provide explainable prediction results. DIFM captures internal field
information from dual perspectives: 1) The Field Value Variations Perspective captures the value
variations of each field between any two events, and the Field Importance-aware module perceives
the importance of different field value variations. 2) The Field Interactions Perspective models the
interactions between all fields inside each event, and the Event Importance-aware module perceives
the importance of different historical events. Besides, the “wide" layer of DIFM can help to score
the values of different fields, which could directly indicate the risk level and therefore be used as
blacklist/whitelist to screen out the fraudulent/good users.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• The DIFM effectively and sufficiently exploits internal field information among events from
the field value variations and field interactions perspectives simultaneously.
• The DIFM perceives the importance of different field value variations and different events
from dual perspectives simultaneously, which can provide explainable prediction results.
• Experimental results on real industrial data from different regions clearly demonstrate
that the proposed DIFM model obtains significant improvement comparing to existing
state-of-the-art approaches.
2 Related Work
In this section, we present the related work in two-fold: feature interactions and sequence prediction,
fraud detection.
Simply using raw features only could rarely yield optimal results in prediction tasks, therefore
more information need to be mined. One way is to learn feature interactions from raw data to
generate efficient feature representations. Data scientists made a lot of effort to derive efficient feature
interactions from raw data (also known as feature engineering) to obtain better prediction performance
[6, 14]. Instead of generating feature interactions manually, solution [28] has been proposed to learn
feature interactions automatically from the raw data. Factorization Machine (FM) [20] is a widely
used method to model second-order feature interactions automatically via the inner product of raw
embedding vectors. Other efforts have also been made to combine the advantages of FM on modeling
second-order feature interactions and neural network on modeling higher-order feature interactions
[10, 30, 9, 15]. However, due to model structure limitation, it is difficult for these methods to exploit
the historical information thoroughly. Most of them only simply capture the interactions among all
features, which are redundant to the task, since it does not differentiate field information between
different events. They do not consider field-in-event-relations and field-between-event-relations,
which we believe is important for fraud detection. The other methods have also attempted to take
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the user’s historical event information into consideration [11, 18, 24, 2, 19, 5, 32, 23]. Nevertheless,
most of these studies mainly focused on the event sequence but ignored the internal field information
of historical events.
Fraud detection is a key technology in e-commerce platforms, early researchers mainly focused on
rule-based expert system [3, 21, 22]. These fraud scenarios contain credit card fraud [3], telephone
fraud [21], insurance fraud [22] and so on. With the rapid evolution of fraud patterns, only human-
summarized rules or expert knowledge are not sufficient to meet the demand of today’s real-time
fraud detection [4], therefore some researchers attempted to use machine-learning based methods
[25, 26, 8, 29, 31, 12, 4, 16] to detect fraud. Fu et al. (2016) focused on Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) for credit card fraud detection [8]. Other works utilized Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)
for sequence-based fraud detection [29, 12, 31]. Liang et al. (2019) utilized Graph Neural Network
(GNN) to spot frauds [16]. However, most of these methods suffer from the same problem: lack of
explainability, which is crucial for fraud detection tasks. In this paper, we propose DIFM model,
which could not only exploit the internal field information among events from dual perspective more
thoroughly but also give insight into the explanation of the prediction results.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first formulate the problem, then present the details of the proposed model DIFM.
3.1 Problem Statement
A simple example of a user’s operation events E is shown in Figure 1(b). Given a user’s operation
events E = [e1, e2, ..., eT ], where T is the number of the events. The fields in each events are fixed
to collect operation information from a specific aspect, e.g. IP city field or payment amount field,
and the number of fields for each event is N . Each field may have multiple values (e.g., in Figure
1(b), the IP field has the values of IP1, IP2, IP3 and so on). et = [xt1, x
t
2, ..., x
t
|V |] (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) is the
t-th event of the user, where |V | is the number of all different field values (i.e., the dictionary size
of field values). For categorical fields (e.g., the IP field), xti (1 ≤ i ≤ |V |) is 1 if et has the value
in the current categorical field, otherwise is 0. For numerical fields (e.g., the Amount field), xti is
the real value. The task is to make a prediction for the current payment event eT according to the
user’s historical operation events [e1, e2, ..., eT−1] and available information of the current payment
event eT . The task can be formulated as Classification, Regression or Pairwise Ranking via utilizing
different activation and loss functions according to real application scenarios as described in [20].
3.2 Factorization Machines and Importance-aware Module
In this subsection, we first describe two basic modules of the DIFM, which are the Factorization
Machines and Importance-aware Module, respectively.
3.2.1 Factorization Machines
As shown in Figure 1(b), there are rich features in each event which describe the event details in
real application scenarios. Since most of the features are one-hot encoding categorical features, the
dimension is usually high and the vectors are sparse. FM is an effective method to address such
high-dimension and sparse problems and it can be seen as performing the latent relation modeling
between any two field values, e.g., the field value variations or field interactions.
Firstly, we project each non-zero field value xi to a low dimension dense vector representation vi.
Embedding layer is a popular solution in the neural network over various application scenarios. It
learns one embedding vector vi ∈ Rk (1 ≤ i ≤ |V |) for each field value xi. where k is the dimension
of embedding vectors. For both categorical and numerical features, we rescale the look-up table
embedding via xivi as done in [10]. Therefore, we only need to include the non-zero features, i.e.,
xi 6= 0.
Different from traditional FM, which uses inner product to get a scalar, in neural network, we need to
get a vector representation via the Hadamard product as done in [10]:
FM(x) =
∑
i6=j
xivi  xjvj . (1)
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Hadamard product  denotes the element-wise product of two vectors: (vi  vj)k = vikvjk. The
computing complexity of the above Equation (1) is O(k|V |2), since all pairwise relations need to be
computed. Actually, the Hadamard product based FM can be reformulated to linear runtime O(k|V |)
[10] just like the inner product based FM [20]:
FM(x) =
1
2
[
(
∑
i
xivi)
2 −
∑
i
(xivi)
2
]
, (2)
where v2 denotes v  v. Besides, in sparse settings, the sums only need to be computed over
the non-zero pairs xixj . Therefore, the actual computing complexity is O(k ˆ|V |), where ˆ|V | is the
number of non-zero entries in x.
3.2.2 Importance-aware Module
In fraud detection, different fields and events often play different roles, which indicate different
importance for the detection task. For field importance, IP address changing or amount changing
over a short period tends to indicate higher risk than value-stable field, therefore we should pay more
attention to IP/amount field if they have such pattern; for event importance, if a user’s event has
multiple abnormal field values, the event is more important than other normal events.
In order to perceive the relative importance of different fields and events, we design an Importance-
aware Module. We hope the model could pay more attention to important fields and events. Attention
mechanism has been proved to be effective in machine translation [1], where the attention makes the
model focus on useful features for the current task. Inspired by the great success of self-attention
in machine translation [27], we design the self-attention-like Importance-aware Module to learn
the importance of different fields and events. The key advantage of the Importance-aware Module
is that it can perceive the importance of different fields and events for each user. For a vector set
FM = {FM1, ...,FMm, ...} of different fields or events captured with the FM, the importance
weight is defined as scaled dot-product:
aˆm =
< F1(FMm), F2(FMm) >√
k
, (3)
am =
exp(aˆm)∑
m exp(aˆm)
, (4)
and the output of the Importance-aware Module (IM ) is represented as:
IM(FM) =
∑
m
amF3(FMm), (5)
where <,> represents the dot-product and F1, F2, and F3 represent the feed-forward networks to
learn for projecting the input vector to one new vector representation. It is worth noting that we find
using different feed-forward networks in the designed attention module is more effective than using a
single feed-forward network only as adopted in [30, 33].
3.3 Field Value Variations Perspective
In this subsection, we model the field value variations with the above two modules.
For hacked account, it would be super-expensive to mimic the real account owner’s complete
environment information, so field value variations (e.g., the IP changing) in different events tends to
indicate higher risk than stable field.
As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, FM can help to capture information of the field value variations.
Now, we apply the field value variations module FM. For the n-th field fn, we perform the field value
variations in all T events as the brown box shown in Figure 2(a):
fn = FM(x
n) =
T−1∑
i=1
T∑
j=i+1
xni v
n
i  xnj vnj . (6)
Now, we apply the field value variations FM (i.e., Equation (6)) to each field in a user’s operation
events, and we get the representations of all fields F = [f1,f2, ...,fN ] thereafter for the Field
Importance-aware Module.
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Figure 2: (a) The proposed DIFM model, for simplicity, we do not represent the “wide" part. (b) The
extracted high-risk fields and events via the Importance-aware Module in two fraud samples.
In fraud detection, if a user’s IP address changes over a short period, the field value variation tends to
indicate a higher risk than stable fields. In order to perceive the relative importance of different fields,
for the vector set F = [f1,f2, ...,fN ] of different fields captured with the FM, we apply the Field
Importance-aware Module in Equation (5) as follows:
f = IM(F ) =
N∑
n=1
anF3(fn), (7)
where an is the importance weight learnt according to the Equation (4). We hope the model could
pay more attention to important fields and focus on useful features for the current task. As long as a
user’s field value variations relate to the fraud label, it will be captured by our model via the field
value variations perspective.
3.4 Field Interactions Perspective
In this subsection, we capture the field interactions with the above two modules.
In fraud detection, a user’s fraud behavior can often be detected by multiple features together, since
it is easier to spot than via a single feature. As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, FM can be seen
as performing the field interactions between any two field values. However, simple calculation
of interactions among all features is inefficient and will introduce noise to the model, since the
interactions of different fields between different events provide little info for the prediction. For
example, fraudster logged in with normal IP#1 in event#1 and buy high-risk item of category
C#2 with high-risk IP#2 in event#2, the interaction between features IP#1 and C#2 provides
little information, while the internal interaction in event#2 (e.g., interaction between C#2 and
IP#2) can capture the event representation better than any single features, and it will improve the
model accuracy. Therefore, we capture the field interactions inside each event. For the t-th event et,
we perform the field interactions in all fields as the blue box shown in Figure 2(a) as follows:
et = FM(x
t) =
|V |−1∑
i=1
|V |∑
j=i+1
xtiv
t
i  xtjvtj . (8)
Thus, we can obtain an effective event representation. Some existing methods [29, 31, 23] can also
obtain an event representation via using a simple dense layer and the embedding concatenation, but
they can not effectively extract the internal information of each behavior event. Now, we apply the
field interactions FM (i.e., Equation (8)) to each event in a user’s operation behaviors, and we get the
representations of all events E = [e1, e2, ..., eT ] thereafter for the Event Importance-aware Module.
Among them, eT is the user’s current payment event, whose risk we are trying to model.
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Besides, the user’s final behavior is strongly correlated with the user’s past several behaviors and
different historical events of users have different importance. For example, in card-stolen fraud
detection scenario, if a user’s event has multiple abnormal field values, the event indicates a higher
risk than the normal event. Therefore, a good model could pay more attention to more important
historical events. In order to perceive the relative importance of different events, for the vector set
Ehis = [e1, e2, ..., eT−1] of different historical events captured with the FM, we apply the Event
Importance-aware Module in Equation (5) as follows:
ehis = IM(Ehis) =
T−1∑
t=1
atF3(et), (9)
where at is the importance weight learnt according to the Equation (4).
Thus, the proposed DIFM can effectively exploit internal features and perceive the importance of
different field value variations and different events from dual perspectives simultaneously. Moreover,
the Field and Event Importance-aware Module can provide explainable prediction results by indicating
which field or event is important for the risk score.
The final DIFM architecture is shown in Figure 2(a), we combine the field value variations feature f
in Equation (7), the field interactions feature ehis in Equation (9) and the current prediction event eT
to feed them to an MLP. The output of the MLP is combined with a “wide" part (for simplicity, we
do not represent this part in Figure 2(a)), and then fed to the sigmoid activation function to form the
final DIFM, which seamlessly combines the field value variations and field interactions perspectives:
s = [f ; ehis; eT ], (10)
yˆ = sigmoid(MLP (s) + f(x)), (11)
where f(x) is the “wide" part just like the part in Wide&Deep [6] and yˆ indicates the probability of
fraud. The f(x) is defined as follows:
f(x) =
T∑
t=1
|V |∑
i=1
wix
t
i + w0, (12)
where wi scores the importance of the field value xi, which can indicate high-risk or low-risk for
directly using in blacklist or whitelist.
For classification tasks, we need to minimize the cross entropy loss:
L(θ) = − 1
S
S∑
(x,y)∈D
((y log yˆ + (1− y) log(1− yˆ)) , (13)
where S is the number of samples, y is the label of sample x and θ is the parameter set, which
contains the embedding vector vi, the weight wi in the “wide" part, and the parameters in F1, F2, F3
and MLP.
The model is implemented using Tensorflow and training is done through stochastic gradient descent
over shuffled mini-batches with the Adam [13] update rule.
4 Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments to evaluate the proposed DIFM model against state-of-the-art
methods on real industrial datasets.
4.1 Datasets
The statistics of all datasets are shown in Table 1. The datasets contain the card (debit card or
credit card) transaction samples from one international e-commerce platform, which utilizes a risk
management system to detect the real-time transaction frauds, e.g., card-stolen cases. We utilize
user’s historical events of the last month in three different regions, i.e. countries from Southeast Asia
(C1, C2, C3), which consist of 6 event types (i.e., sign up, sign in, digital goods payment, regular
goods payment, information modification and card binding). And for all events, the following fields
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the datasets.
Dataset #pos #neg #fields #events
C1 15K 1.37M 56 4.28M
C2 10K 1.93M 56 3.57M
C3 5.7K 174K 56 353K
are used in our analysis: IP-information, shipping-information, billing-information, card-information,
item-category, operation-result, user-account-information, device-information, etc. The task is to
detect whether the current payment event is a card-stolen case. The fraud labels are from the
chargeback from card issuer banks (e.g., the card issuer receives claims on unauthorized charges from
the cardholders and reports related transaction frauds to the merchants) and label propagation (e.g.,
the device and card information are also utilized to mark similar transactions).
4.2 Baselines
We compare the proposed method with the following competitive and mainstream models which
contain feature interactions based models (W&D, DeepFM, NFM, AFM, xDeepFM) and event
sequence based models (LSTM4FD, LCRNN, M3). For all feature interactions based models, we use
all the features of the user’s events as the input:
• W&D [6]: It consists of “wide" and “Deep" parts, where the “wide" part is a linear model
and the “Deep" part is an MLP.
• DeepFM [9]: FM and MLP are combined in this model and fed to the output layer in
parallel.
• NFM [10]: This is a simple and efficient neural factorization machine model whose FM is
fed to MLP for capturing higher-order feature interactions.
• AFM [30]: It adds the attention mechanism to the FM to consider the importance of different
pairs.
• xDeepFM [15]: This is the state-of-the-art feature interactions based model which attempts
to learn higher-order feature interactions explicitly.
• LSTM4FD [29, 31]: These works have applied LSTM for fraud detection task, and we call
these methods as LSTM4FD.
• LCRNN [2]: It uses “Latent Cross" to incorporate contextual data in the RNN by embed-
ding the context feature first and then performing an element-wise product of the context
embedding with the model’s hidden states.
• M3 [23]: This is the state-of-the-art event sequence based model which deals with both
short-term and long-term dependencies with mixture models, we choose the better one
mixture model M3R-TSL.
4.3 Implementation Details
For all datasets, we use: embedding dimension k of 64, the maximum number of events T of 20, one
hidden layer of MLP and the dimension is 64, mini-batch size of 256 and learning rate of 0.0005.
We also use L2 regularization with λ = 1e− 6, and dropout probability is 0.2. All these values and
hyper-parameters of all baselines are chosen via a grid search on the C1 validation set. We do not
perform any datasets-specific tuning except early stopping on validation sets. The proposed model is
trained offline and regularly updated. Meanwhile, the prediction phase is relatively fast, which can
meet the requirement of real-time solutions.
4.4 Evaluation Metrics
In binary classification tasks, AUC (Area Under ROC) is a widely used metric [7]. In our real
card-stolen fraud detection scenario, we should increase the recall rate of the fraudulent transactions,
at the same time, disturbing as few normal users as possible. In other words, we need to improve
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Table 2: AUCFPR≤1% performance (mean±95% confidence intervals) on three datasets.
Model
C1 C2 C3
AUCFPR≤1% AUCFPR≤1% AUCFPR≤1%
W&D 0.6997±0.0014 0.7770±0.0023 0.8202±0.0092
DeepFM 0.7070±0.0060 0.7725±0.0035 0.8476±0.0070
NFM 0.7467±0.0032 0.7931±0.0074 0.8310±0.0221
AFM 0.7086±0.0047 0.7801±0.0065 0.8499±0.0073
xDeepFM 0.7391±0.0044 0.7833±0.0084 0.8557±0.0137
LSTM4FD 0.7118±0.0087 0.7356±0.0084 0.7762±0.0086
LCRNN 0.7189±0.0068 0.7847±0.0109 0.8162±0.0191
M3 0.7294±0.0060 0.7897±0.0053 0.7618±0.0268
DIFM-same 0.7512±0.0043 0.8275±0.0063 0.8617±0.0147
DIFM-α 0.7401±0.0070 0.8075±0.0065 0.8535±0.0185
DIFM-β 0.7640±0.0105 0.8228±0.0086 0.8630±0.0060
DIFM 0.7681±0.0088 0.8491±0.0083 0.8866±0.0111
the True Positive Rate (TPR) on the basis of low False Positive Rate (FPR). Therefore, we adopt the
standardized partial AUC (AUCFPR≤maxfpr) [17] (The standardized area of the head of the ROC
curve when the FPR ≤ maxfpr). In practice, we require FPR to be less than 1%. Hence, we use
AUCFPR≤1% for all experiments. For all experiments, we report the metric with 95% confidence
intervals on five runs.
4.5 Experimental Results
The experimental results evaluated by AUCFPR≤1% on C1, C2 and C3 are presented in Table 2. We
can clearly observe that the performance of baseline models varies on different countries.
For the C1 dataset, the performance of W&D is inferior compared with other baselines on
AUCFPR≤1%, perhaps because W&D can not automatically learn feature interactions, and it is
just a simple linear model in its “wide" part. Besides, DeepFM and AFM obtain similar performance
compared with W&D. DeepFM and W&D are both parallel structures, although the FM in DeepFM
captures second-order feature interactions, it is directly fed to the output layer failing to capture
higher-order feature interactions. Pairs weighted AFM is also directly fed to the output layer, which is
lack of higher-order feature interactions. On the contrary, the FM in NFM is fed to MLP for capturing
higher-order feature interactions, so NFM almost performs the best among all baseline models. Simi-
larly, xDeepFM attempts to learn higher-order feature interactions explicitly, so xDeepFM improves
the results compared with W&D and DeepFM. For event sequence based models, LSTM4FD and
LCRNN obtain similar performance. M3 obtains further performance improvement due to dealing
with both short-term and long-term sequence dependencies with mixture models. However, these
models do not consider feature interactions, so the improvement is limited.
Similar results can also be observed on the C2 dataset for feature interactions based models. For
event sequence based models, the performance of LSTM4FD, which simply apply LSTM for fraud
detection, is not good enough. LCRNN and M3 obtain similar performance and LCRNN incorporating
the contextual data in the RNN is effective for the C2 dataset.
For the C3 dataset, it has fewer positive samples, negative samples and available events than C1 and
C2 as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the AUCFPR≤1% performance of these models varies a lot, and
the 95% confidence intervals of AUCFPR≤1% of these baseline models is obviously larger than the
performance on C1 and C2 datasets. Besides, for event sequence based models, LSTM4FD, LCRNN,
and M3 are undesirable due to the fewer number of historical events on the C3 dataset.
Besides, the DIFM which uses different feed-forward networks in the Importance-aware Module is
more effective than the DIFM-same which only uses a single feed-forward network. Moreover, for un-
derstanding the contribution of different perspectives in our model, we construct ablation experiments
over DIFM-α, DIFM-β and DIFM. DIFM-α and DIFM-β utilize the field value variations perspective
and field interactions perspective in their models, respectively. The field interactions perspective
brings greater gain than the field value variations perspective. Furthermore, the proposed DIFM model
can efficiently take advantage of internal field features among events from dual perspectives and
obtain the best performance on all three datasets, which indicates both two perspectives matter for
the performance. Instead of capturing sequence info directly, our DIFM capture more fine-grained
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Table 3: The extracted high risk (high weight) and low risk (low weight) field values according to the
learned weights in Equation (12), the “Card bin" is the last six digits of the card number, the “IP ISP"
is Internet Service Provider for the IP, the “Email suffix" is the suffix of the email and the “Issuer" is
the name of the issuing bank.
Card bin IP ISP Email suffix Issuer
#1 (94/105) #1 (5/8) #1 (28/28) #1 (76/79)
High #2 (46/46) #2 (30/30) #2 (59/59) #2 (136/137)
Risk #3 (12/12) #3 (22/22) #3 (56/60) #3 (105/113)
#4 (78/82) #4 (4/5) #4 (149/183) #4 (77/85)
#5 (0/58) #5 (0/81) #5 (0/1120) #5 (1/1008)
Low #6 (0/181) #6 (0/384) #6 (0/101) #6 (0/34)
Risk #7 (0/38) #7 (0/89) #7 (3/5958) #7 (0/20)
#8 (0/239) #8 (0/38) #8 (0/79) #8 (0/54)
value-variations information. Frequent value-variations of certain field in event sequences is a signal
which strongly correlates to fraudulent activities. For example, user with IP changing from IP#1 to
IP#2 indicates higher risk comparing to user with stable IP. DIFM captures value-variations of each
field between any two events in user’s operation sequences via the Field Value Variations module.
Combined with Field Interactions module, which captures field-in-event-relations, our proposed
framework captures useful info more effectively. That’s why it performs better than the RNN-based
baselines. These improvements also indicate that the proposed DIFM model can better handle the
fraud detection task.
4.6 Case Study
In this subsection, we make some analysis on the explainability of the proposed DIFM on C3 dataset.
Firstly, we extract four highest-risk and lowest-risk field values from four fields according to the
learned weights of “wide" part in Equation (12). We present the field values in Table 3. To conform
to Data-Protection-Regulation of the company, we replace the real field values with #number and
present the ratio of each field value with (fraud number/total number). We can clearly observe that
these extracted field values are very strong indicators of fraud or not. For example, the Email suffix
#2 occurs 59 times and all of them are fraud samples, while the Email suffix #5 occurs 1120 times
and all of them are normal usage. Therefore, these field values can be directly added to the blacklist
and whitelist. By the way, in our risk management system, model predication is used together with
rule-based methods, and this gives double insurance to our system.
Then, we extract some high-risk fields and events for two fraud samples according to the learned
importance weights in Equation (4). We normalize the weights. The field value variations of each
field and field interactions of each event can be regarded as modeling of users’ fraud patterns. We
present the fraud patterns in Figure 2(b). The solid circle represents that the field value has changed
since the last event. The depth of color for each square illustrates the distributions of importance
weights. The darker the color is, the higher weight it has.
The fields of Card bin, IP ISP, Email suffix and Issuer should be relatively stable for normal users,
but for sample (1), the values of these fields change multiple times in the account’s operation history,
which indicates a high risk. Therefore, these fields obtain higher weights and stable fields have lower
weights. Meanwhile, the events 2, 4, and 5 have multiple abnormal field values, so they are more
important than other normal events. The distribution of the event weights also confirms this. The
similar pattern can also be observed in the sample (2).
These above observations demonstrate that our DIFM model can effectively find the important fields
and events from dual perspectives. These above results also demonstrate that the proposed DIFM has
the capability to provide explainable prediction results. These explanations are of great help to the
experts in fraud detection for further analysis.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we designed a DIFM model for online transaction fraud detection. Specifically,
DIFM utilizes the Factorization Machines and the proposed Importance-aware Module to exploit the
internal field information among behaviors from dual perspectives, which are field value variations
perspective and field interactions perspective. The extensive experimental results on real-world
datasets from a world-leading e-commerce platform clearly demonstrate the performance improve-
ments of our proposed model compared with various state-of-the-art baseline methods and the case
study further approves the explainability of our model.
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